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Constitutions for the 21st Century  
Emerging Patterns—the EU, Iraq, Afghanistan…* 
 
Chibli Mallat** 
 I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONALISM’S INTERNATIONAL DRIVE Amongst  the  furthest  encompassing  contemporary  reflections  on  law stand  the  works  of  Paul  Kahn.  In  a  contribution  to  a  Latin American/New England  seminar  on  law and violence  in 2003, he had this to say about the EU:   The political project of the EU, for example, is about displacing a sacrificial politics with a set of bureaucratic arrangements for the  administration  of  markets  and  social‐welfare.  If  the romantic  element  in  Western  politics  has  been  in  its attachment  to sacrifice of  the body,  the EU project  is  just  the opposite:  it  is politics as management of  the well‐being of  the body.  The  bureaucrat  in  Brussels  is  the  very  opposite  of  the romantic  politician.  The  longing  to  join  the  EU  among  the countries  of  Eastern  Europe  is  not  just  about  economics,  but also about depoliticalization, i.e., about an emerging perception of sacrificial politics as a form of pathology. Indeed, the entire effort of the international human rights movement is rooted in this  vision  of well‐being.  No  one,  on  this  view,  should  die  or suffer for politics.1 
 
 *   The Third Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke 
University School of Law, Sept. 28, 2004. Reprinted with permission from CONSTITUTIONS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, EMERGING PATTERNS: THE EU, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN…, in THE LAW 
APPLIED, CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARIA’A 194 (PERI BEARMAN, ET AL. EDS., I.B. TAURUS & 
CO LTD, 2008).   
 **   Presidential Professor of Law, University of Utah, Jean Monnet Chair in Law, EU 
Centre of Excellence, University Saint Joseph. Principal, Mallat law offices, Beirut. This is a 
lightly footnoted version of the Third Herbert L. Bernstein Annual Memorial Lecture in 
International and Comparative Law read at Duke Law School on September 28, 2004. I have 
updated the text slightly considering the important changes in both the EU and Iraqi 
constitutional scenes; the central argument has not changed. 
 1. Paul W. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” SELA 2003, 13. SELA, acronym of Seminario en 
Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Democracia, brings together a group of leading 
academics mostly from Latin American and North American law schools, who meet usually 
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There are several strands  in the Kahnian view which will appear elusive  for  those  who  have  not  followed  his  fertile  search  for  the triangle love‐law‐religion, and the meanings relevant to the triangle for such  issues  as  war  and  international  relations,  the  body,  or  human rights.  In a vision which tends to be overall bleak, the silver  lining  is a peculiar  form  of  legal  optimism,  which  is  of  significance  to  anyone interested in reform despite the less humane aspects of human beings.2 Here we need to bifurcate: One bifurcation regards the EU and constitution‐making, the other is Kantian, and regards constitutions and war. Strong  moments  in  constitution‐making  often  result  from traumas—sacrificial  politics,  amongst  which  the  archetype  stands  as Abraham’s offer to sacrifice his son for God in order to save his people, religion and nation. The case of the EU, which is universally considered a triumph of Europe over its 20th Century most tragic traumas, two World Wars  for the Europe of 6,  the Cold War for Europe of  the 25 to 30,  is a living,  acknowledged  example,  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  another.  Nothing defines trauma for Afghanis and Iraqis more than war, internal and inter‐national, for over a quarter of a century, and their most lasting response, if war  is  to be transcended, will be a working constitution. Here stands the  contribution  of  Kahn  at  its  best:  21st  century  constitution‐making conceived  as  a  response  to  the  failures  of  the  20th  century,  and  a  new prism—the love, religion, law triangle—to go beyond comparing the trite and the insignificant, or the incomparable, or the hard to compare. This chapter  follows a similar quest. Rather than looking at these three  perforce  unique  constitutions  simply  through  black‐letter  law,  I shall  try  to  look  beyond  the  arrangements  of  the  respective constitutional texts for the emerging patterns of constitution‐making. Before  that,  a  brief  word  off  the  Kantian  bifurcation  in  its  leg which  is  not  totally  unrelated  to  the  argument  of  this  chapter—that there  is  a  core  common  thematic  constitutional  horizon  across  the planet. That leg is the subject of a separate “work in progress.” As Kahn also  says,  “after  Einstein,  we  are  all  Kantians,”3  and  no  person  has 
 
once a year under the auspices of the Yale Law School. SELA is animated by Professor 
Owen Fiss. I read here Depoliticization instead of Depoliticalization. 
 2. We find Kahn bleak on the intersection of psychology and law (Law and Love: The 
Trials of King Lear, New Haven, 2000) and international law (“Universal Jurisdiction and the 
Rule of Law,” in John Borneman ed., The Case of Ariel Sharon Case and the Fate of 
Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton 2004, 131–145); more positive on domestic law, The Reign 
of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, New Haven 1997; Legitimacy 
and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory, New Haven 1992. 
 3. Kahn, “Sacred Violence,” 3. 
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written a more meaningful treatise on war, constitutional treatises and international law than Immanuel Kant. On the occasion the bicentenary of Kant’s death, the Goethe‐Institut has been particularly inspired in its depiction  of  the  2004 Zeitgeist  through  the  poster which  puts,  on  the one side, the 300+ wars that have befallen mankind since 1804, on the other  the  text  of  his  Treatise  for  a  Perpetual  Peace.4  That  dimension belongs to a separate work, in progress, on Kant’s TPP, but it cannot be totally shorn from our present reflection, so much steeped in war those societies  working  out  these  constitutional  texts,  and  so  menacing  to both domestic and international peace if they fail their promise. Should Iraq,  Afghanistan  and  the  EU  roll  their  constitutions  back,  and  the political trend seems to indicate that they have, much of the promise of peace will fall by the wayside. In  Europe,  the  new  constitutional  order  was  designed  by  Jean Monnet to prevent a repeat of World Wars I and II, both classic wars. A collapse of the Afghani and Iraqi theatres of violence in the so‐called “war on terrorism,” a sui generis development increasingly dubbed as the third or  fourth  world  war,  will  have  incalculable  consequences  first  for  the peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for the rest of the planet.5 So while that part of  the Kantian bifurcation would appear at  first glance  to  stand  outside  the  pale  of  the  present  study,  constitution  as antidote to war suffuses it throughout: already the inside‐outside image of constitutions is breaking at the seams. Traditionally, constitutions are eminently sovereign texts, made by people to rule themselves by them‐selves.  This  is  no  longer  the  case.  The  fiction  of  a  self‐organized  Iraqi constitution,  or  of  a  self‐organized  Afghani  constitution,  might  be naturally  peddled  by  the  Iraqi  and  Afghani  governments,  few  believe their constitutional input and output isn’t international. As for the Euro‐pean  Union,  even  a  fiction  encompassing  the  15  Member‐States,  or indeed  the additional  ten delegations  from  the enlarged  continent who attended  the  Constitutional  Convention,  makes  the  effort  by  nature  a particularly non‐national one. More  importantly,  the  international drive 
 
 4. All the major wars are listed on a poster published on the anniversary of Kant’s 
double centenary’s death in 2004 by the Goethe-Institut. Kant’s famous treatise, Zum Ewigen 
Frieden. appeared first in 1795. 
 5. James Woolsey, CIA director during the first Clinton Administration, is to my 
knowledge at the origins of the description of the post-September 11 era as “fourth world 
war.” For a robust legal debate on the contours of the new “war,” see Bruce Ackerman, “The 
Emergency Constitution,” 113 Yale. L.J. 1029 (2004) and the forum devoted to the responses 
of David Cole, “The priority of morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot,” 113 Yale 
L.J. 1753 (2004), and of Laurence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge, “The Anti-Emergency 
Constitution,” 113 Yale L.J. 1801 (2004), together with the rejoinder of Ackerman, “This is Not 
a War,” 113 Yale L.J. 1871 (2004). 
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of  E.U.  constitutionalism  is  now  formally  enshrined  in  the  European Union’s “proximity policy.” Proximity is not only about Turkey, the immediate next‐door giant of  the EU. The most  intriguing, perhaps the most  interesting article  in the  European  Constitution  in  terms  of  emerging  patterns—read  here challenges—of the 21st century appears in Part I, Title VIII of the text,  Title VIII, The Union and its Neighbours Article I‐57: The Union and its Neighbours 1.  The  Union  shall  develop  a  special  relationship  with neighbouring States, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and  characterised  by  close  and  peaceful  relations  based  on cooperation.6  Much  has  been  built  on  this  seemingly  innocuous  article,  on different levels. On the political plane, a full and daring proximity policy was announced and followed through,  from a European perspective, by the former head of the Commission, Professor Romano Prodi. This policy suggests  including  any  willing  neighbouring  state  in  the  EU  system, except  for  the  institutions.  Short  of  voting  and  being  represented  in Brussels,  “everything  else”  could  be  common,  European.7  On  the  aca‐demic  plane,  I  have  tried  to  develop  this  concept  as  a  solution  to  the Arab‐Israeli problem by way of a Hegelian‐style Aufhebung resting on the freedom  of  circulation  and  establishment  through  the  new  immense territory constituted by the EU + its Mediterranean neighbourhood.8 The EU as solution to the hundred‐year conflict over Palestine is one striking illustration,  following  which  the  right  to  return  for  Palestinians  would find  its  application  in  their  freedom  of  movement  over  the  new  “EU” territory that includes Israel. For Israel, the fear of a destabilizing influx would be tempered by its opening up to a European space where part of its security would be naturally one shared with the EU. 
 
 6. EU Constitution, final draft as agreed in Dublin, June 2004 (Text widely available on 
the internet, hereinafter EU Constitution). 
 7. Romano Prodi, “L’Europe et la Méditerranée: venons en aux faits,” Louvain-la-
neuve, 26 Novembre 2002 ; Romano Prodi, “L’Europa più grande: una politica di vicinato 
come chiave di stabilità,” ECSA conference, Bruxelles, 5-6 Décembre 2002, COM (203) 104, 
Bruxelles 11 Mars 2003. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées entre l’Union et les pays voisins,” 
ECSA 2002, 5 December 2002, forthcoming as EU Commission publication. 
 8. See Mallat, “George Weidenfeld’s bright idea,” The Daily Star, 16 July 2003; “L’UE 
entre déficit démocratique et Méditerranée en feu,” L’Orient-Le Jour, 21 June 2004. 
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This  is  a  long  shot,  a  generation  at  least  away.  Still,  if  emerging patterns for the 21st century are to be sought, one can see how the EU has now  internalized,  in  the  revolutionary  text  of  Art.I‐57,  that  pattern  of constitutional  internationalization. While  it sounds excessive to think of it in such grandiloquent terms as the chance of a peaceful Mediterranean, more  specifically  a  solution  to  the  Arab‐Israeli  conflict  much  in  the manner  that Europe has  “solved”  the Northern  Ireland problem, one  is staring in Art.57 the promise of a century, not just of a few years. And if the  Good  Friday Agreement marks  a  real  turning  point  in  Irish history conceived in its four‐centuries long pattern of violence, it is undoubtedly the result of European integration. For it can hardly be conceived outside the framework of the concept of regionalization—and the hankering for a realization of subsidiarity across Europe and within its regions, the well‐established as well as the contentious ones.9 II. SIMPLIFIERS: PERSISTENT MONTESQUIEUIAN ISSUES So much  for  constitutionalism’s  international  drive.  Let  us  take  a  step back, and indulge in a few simplifiers. By simplifiers I mean those trusted mileposts which are the basics of constitutional making, and which any drafter needs to contemplate in accordance with a received vision which is  essentially  an  eighteenth  century  legacy  of  political science/constitutionalism, more specifically a Montesquieuian one. This is  the  concept  of  separation  of  powers,  or  the  checks  and  balances  in American  lore, coupled with the concept of  federalism to accommodate regional disparities. Such vertical and horizontal division of powers is the stuff of any constitution‐making, arguably since Plato and Aristotle,10 and goes  along  a  number  of  classical  questions  from  both  sides  of  society. Seen  from  the  top,  how  solid  and  impermeable  are  the  boundaries between  powers  in  the  state?  This,  reduced  to  its  simplest  expression, raises the need to make a choice between a presidential and  legislative constitution,  and  a  choice  between  a  federal  system  and  a  centralized one.  What  are  the  powers  of  federated  states,  and  if  there  are  no federated  states,  how  is  power  devolved  and  exercised  by  regional entities? Seen from the bottom, what voting power does the citizen have, as  individual  and as member  of  a  collectivity? What  recourse  does  the individual have in case of infringement on his or her rights as enshrined in the text? 
 
 9. For some of the extensive treatments in this vein of Northern Ireland and Palestine, 
see e.g. the works of Gideon Gotlieb and Donald Horowitz. 
 10. Central reference to Plato’s Republic ix, Aristotle’s Politics, chapter 1, Cicero’s De 
Republica, chapters 1 and 2. 
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Now even simplifiers can make life complicated when comparisons are exercised  in dual  terms,  let  alone when  three nascent  constitutions are being compared. National systems of  law,  the  first year  law student learns  quickly,  are  self‐sufficient.  In  a  fiction  which  is  essential  to understanding its realm, law operates outside history as well as outside geography.  Legal  history  might  explain  much,  but  it  works  in  a  way irrelevant  to  the  substance,  or  content,  provided  by  a  given  law. Comparative law is an additional luxury: use of comparative law may be edifying, enlightening or enriching, even persuasive; it is never decisive. Yes,  there are  increasing exceptions  in global  law.11 But  legal history, as well  as  comparative  law,  remain  luxuries.  The  law  stands  for  what  it disposes hic et nunc, not for how it came about, or what country it com‐pares with beyond the realm of the jurisdiction in which it holds sway. It therefore makes sense, from the vantage point of simplifiers, at the overall architectonics of our three constitutions, with each as a self‐contained arrangement. 
Afghanistan.  Starting  with  the  simplest,  the  Constitution  of  “the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” as defined in Article 1. Simplest because it  has  now  been  adopted  (24  January  2004);  the  other  two  remain transient, either getting superseded by repeated amendments as in Iraq, or frozen, as for the EU after the rejection of the agreed text by a majority of  the  French  and  Dutch  citizens.  Simplest  because  it  is  an  essentially presidential constitution, with a person—Hamid Karzai—in mind draw‐ing  the  constitution  and  implementing  it.  Simplest  because  there  is  no federalism  in  the  text.  Simplest  because,  despite  the  international convulsions in the modern history of Afghanistan, the non‐Afghani input, unlike for Iraq and the EU, is limited. Simplest, finally, because there does not  seem  to  have  been  too  much  work  behind  it.12  By  contrast,  the emergence  of  the  Iranian  Constitution  in  1979  has  left  constitutional scholars a formidable trail of constituents’ minutes.13 
 
 11. Progress in comparative law within the US Supreme Court can be read in Stanford 
v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2001) cert. denied 71 USLW 3236 (S.Ct. 2002), decided on 
October 7, 2002 (execution of juvenile offenders) and in Atkins v. Virginia, No. 00-8452, 
decided on 20 June 2002. (execution of mentally retarded defenders). The trend is 
adumbrated and developed in Harold Koh, “Paying ‘Decent Respect’ to World Opinion on the 
Death Penalty,” 35 UC David L R 1085–1131, at 1104. Judith Resnik, “Law’s Migration: 
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry,” 115 
Yale L.J. 1564 (2006). 
 12. The little available can be found in a report by the Secretariat of the Constitutional 
Commission of Afghanistan, ‘The Constitution-making Process,’ 10 March 2003. Henceforth 
reference to “Afghani Constitution,” text available as pdf in English, Pashtu and Dari on the 
internet, e.g. on http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/afghanistan.html. 
 13. They can be found in two series of official documents, of three and four volumes 
respectively, entitled Surat-e mashruh-e muzakarat-e shura-ye majles-e barrasi-ye niha’i-ye 
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Composed  of  a  preamble  and  one  hundred  and  sixty  articles,  and divided into twelve neat chapters, the Afghani Constitution was written in Pashtu and Dari,  two of  the several  languages  recognized by Article 16.14 Following  a  familiar  and  didactic  terrain,  the  Constitution  presents  the main  attributes  of  the  State  of  Afghanistan  in  the  Preamble  and  first chapter—flag, languages, religion, economic traits and state responsibility for citizens’ welfare, education, place in the international order—followed by  the  citizens’  fundamental  rights  (chapter  2).  The  organs  of  the  state cover  chapters  3  to  8:  presidency,  government,  national  assembly,  Loya Jirga,  judiciary,  administrative  divisions.  “Special  dispositions”  are enshrined  in the  last  four  chapters,  including the state of  emergency and the amendment process. Most significant in terms of separation of powers is  the establishment of Afghanistan as a  centralized presidential republic, where the head of the executive is elected directly by popular suffrage if he or  she  gets  over  50  percent  of  the  vote.  The  two  candidates  with  the highest vote in the first turn, as in France, fight it out in a second turn.15 “No one can be elected as president for more than two terms.”16 The  president  is  extremely  powerful  under  the  Constitution,  as  he heads  the  Cabinet—there  is  no  Prime  Minister.  The  list  of  presidential prerogatives  is  long  and  wide‐ranging,  to  which  should  be  added  the prerogatives of a cabinet which cannot be brought down by Parliament by a  vote  of  confidence,  with  the  exception  of  individual  ministers.  The president  is  even  entitled  to  name  some  of  the  members  of  the  Upper House (the Elders’ House). Parliament under the Constitution is composed of  two  houses,  to  which  should  be  added  the  Loya  Jirga,  originally  a congregation  of  tribal  leaders  in  which  the  Constitution  vests  some historical mantle of  sovereignty.17  In  reality,  the Loya  Jirga  consists  of  all the  parliamentarians,  to  which  are  added  provincial  and  district  council heads, and the members of government. The Loya Jirga is supposed to deal with the supreme interests of the country, but it is again the president who is entitled to convene it. Presumably, it can in some cases meet of its own 
 
qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran 1985-89) and Surat-e mashruh-e 
muzakarat-e shura-ye baznegari-ye qanun-e asasi-ye jumhuri-ye islami-ye iran (Tehran 
1990). 
 14. Afghani Constitution, Art.16:  “Pashtu and Dari (which is a variation of Persian) are 
the official languages of the state.” 
 15. Afghani Constitution, Art.61. 
 16. Afghani Constitution, Art. 62. 
 17. Afghani Constitution, Art.110, Loya Jirga as historical “manifestation of the people of 
Afghanistan,” see the classic work of the late Louis Dupree (d. 1989), Afghanistan, Princeton 
1980. 
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accord, since it is also entitled to pass judgment on the president in case he dramatically fails his duties, such as committing crimes against humanity.18 Loya Jirga and “crimes against humanity,” a phrase which appears in several  articles  of  the  Afghan  constitution,  provides  the  comparative lawyer with the most original concepts in the text. The bottom line is about centralized  presidential  power,  where  the  battle  will  be  fought  for  the foreseeable  future,  for  Afghanistan  as well  as  for  Iraq,  and,  to  an  extent which we need to dwell also upon, in the European Union. The place of the president  as  chief  executive  rallying  the  country  is  the  more  important locus  of  constitutional  attention  since  the  Afghani  and  Iraqi  experience, despite  sharing  common  “international”  inputs,  underline  the  difficult  of agreeing  on  the  place  of  the  head  of  the  executive  branch  under  a Montesquieuian  scheme  of  things.  In  Afghanistan,  as  the  text  stands,  the president  trumps  the  rest  of  the  Constitutional  arrangements,  be  they central  or  federal.  This  may  be  unwise,  especially  since  the  incumbent owes his position to “being the smallest common denominator” picked by the  UN.19  The  battle  for  executive  power  will  continue  to  define constitution‐making  in the 21st  century,  as  it has  from time  immemorial. This is a certainty. Whether it is wise is a different matter. 
Iraq.  In  Iraq,  the  battle  for  the presidency has  taken another  shape, despite  a  similar  international  input,  including  the  same  UN  envoy.  It played itself out differently, and the idiosyncrasies of history got the upper hand on planning.20 Unfortunate Iraqis, trying to find some peace after thirty five years of  solid  dictatorship,  including  the  longest  Middle  East  war  in  20th century  history,  and  two  or  three  invasions,  that  is  their  invasion  of others,  and  others  invading  them,  plus  a  twelve year  sanctions  regime followed by occupation: in the midst of which mayhem they put together a  “wonderful  new  Constitution.”21  It  is  true  that  the  Iraqis,  who  forge 
 
 18. Afghani Constitution, Arts. 110 to 115. 
 19. As explained by the UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi, who supported Hamid Karzai’s 
nomination on the basis that his name appeared on all the lists requested from the various 
leaders and lawlords of Afghanistan. 
 20. For some of these highly unusual circumstances, Mallat, “Malgré tout, une leçon de 
démocratie à Bagdad,” L'Orient-le Jour, 2 June 2004. 
 21. The description of the Constitution as “wonderful” is owed to the editors of the New 
York Times who propped up the comment I submitted into excessive enthusiasm, “East 
Meets West, at Least on Paper,” New York Times, 11 March 2004. Here I discuss what 
became know in English as the Transitional Administrative Law, TAL (Qanun idarat al-dawlat, 
literally the law for the governance of the country, agreed on March 1, 2004 by the Iraqi 
Governing Council, and published by the Coalition Provisional Authority on 8 March as “Law 
of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period.”) The TAL, which preceded 
the “final” Constitution of 2005, exhibits similar trends. The “final” Constitution of 2005 
mentions that it needs to be completed, and so its finality is relative even on its own accord. 
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ahead  with  a  Constitution  against  the  odds,  deserve  a  burst  of enthusiastic  kudos.  But  one  should  perhaps  remain  reserved  on  such elusive  matters  for  fear  of  ridicule—getting  “mugged  by  reality”  is  a fashionable term. In  the midst of  so much violence, how did  they do  it  in  Iraq?  They, here,  are  a  hapless  though  talented  duo:  Iraqi‐”international”  (chiefly American). One must realize what constitution‐writing means in Iraq 2004, and  it means a  lot of English, not only because a U.N. Security Resolution had  consecrated  a  governor  of  Iraq  who  is  solely  American‐English speaking,  and  so wields  the  ultimate  signature upon  any  text  Iraqis may want  to  turn  into  law,  but  more  fundamentally  because  the  legal  and judicial  body  politic  of  Iraq  is  simply  inexistent.  It  is,  unfortunately,  as tragic as it sounds: so destructive of any judicial independence has the rule of  the  former  Iraqi dictator  been  that  Iraqi  jurists who  remained  in  Iraq simply  lost  confidence  in their  job and themselves. Not that there are no talents, dedication or competence: chapters of judicial and legal resistance in  the  Iraqi  dictatorship  are  yet  to  be  written.  Polyglottism  (especially Western. . .) was a mark of treason for dark, fascist Arabism in the heyday of  the  long  Baathist  night.22  The  systematic  destruction  of  Iraqi  legal culture,  its  lawyers,  judges  and  law  schools,  meant  that  constitution drafting was left to those coming from the outside. There simply aren’t so many people capable of writing up a constitution  in English words which are also Arabic, and occasionally, Kurdish. So  hail  to  the  two  drafters,  and  their  advisors.  Friendship  being involved  here  on  both  the  drafting  side  and  the  advising  side,  all  shall remain  nameless.  The  result  is  what  matters  for  the  purpose  of  the present chapter, and that result is a longish text, with a didactic effort (62 articles  in  nine parts).  The  Transitional  Administrative  Law  self‐erased when  the  elections  planned  for  January  2005  resulted  in  a  Parliament which was tasked with writing the ultimate text and putting it to the vote. Meanwhile,  some  constitutional  landmarks  have  been  posted  for  Iraq. While  buffeted  by  barbaric  violence  on  a  scale  which  knows  few  such precedents  on  the  planet,  the  process  moved  decisively  forward  in textual terms. Three matters draw the TAL reader’s attention: the first is the place reserved for women, who were to constitute a quarter of Parliament. The second is the open reference to federalism. The third is the care given to 
 
 22. Conversation with the late Hani Fukaiki, May 2002, in Kurdish Iraq, who, as a former 
active member of the Baath leadership, explained to me how knowledge of a Western 
language was suspicious and frowned upon as a sure mark of “treason.” 
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the  protection  of  the  individual’s  right.  All  three  remained  in  the  2005 Constitution. If  Iraq  wished  to  remain  at  the  forefront  of  Middle  East  (ME) democracy—a  position  which  it  will  continue  to  pretend  to,  despite  it being rocked by violence, both in terms of the freedoms it carries, and the fact  that  those  in  power  owe  it  neither  to  dynasty,  nor  to  the  ME‐dominant  self‐extension  of  presidential  mandate—then  Iraqi  society needs  to  protect  those  two  achievements,  women  representation  and federalism.  This  will  not  be  easy.  As  for  the  judicial  protection  of  the person’s basic rights, it will come only after Iraqi society overcomes the violence that plagues it, and finds a way to stand on its two feet without foreign armies dictating the terms of social peace. Much of  this commentary  is arguably hypothetical, but the morass of  Iraqi politics should not mask the forest  for the trees. In Iraq, consti‐tutionalism  has  forged  ahead  in  the most  delicate  of  all  arrangements, that is the attempt for a constitution to be inclusive of two dominant and competing  national  identities—Kurdish  and  Arab—and  two  dominant and competing religious sects, Shi’i and Sunni Islam. Even under the most elaborate constitutional schemes, which Donald Horowitz has dissected in many different approaches over three decades of scholarly attention to “discrete  and  insular  minorities”  across  the  world,23  one  would  find  it difficult  to  draw  a model  near  enough  accommodating  the  Iraqi  socio‐historical  set‐up.  Nor  have  the  Iraqi  constituents  succeeded  yet  in convincing their people, and the world at  large,  that they are out of  the woods  of  overwhelming  sectarianism  in  the  individual  politician’s political expression. 
The European Union.  The Constitution  finally  agreed upon by  the European  Council  (of heads of  states) meeting  in Dublin  in  June 2004 stands  outside  any  recognizable  model  in  the  field:  This  for  obvious reasons owing to the history of European integration. But it also stands out  for  technical  reasons  obtaining  from  its  fissiparous  genesis:  the Constitution makes no sense for the reader outside the accumulation of texts  since  the  six  European  communities  came  together  on  the  so‐called common market in Rome in 1957. This accumulation of treaties, and of  legislative,  judicial and administrative acts,  is known as “acquis communautaire.” In  any  appreciation  of  constitution‐making,  it  would  not  be appropriate  to  mark  solely  progress.  There  also  are  setbacks.  One certain  failure  in  the  EU  text  concerns  its  style.  However  hard  the constituents tried to make the text of  the Constitution palatable to the 
 
 23. See e.g. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley 2001. 
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educated  but  non‐specialist  reader,  this  effort  was  a  failure.  Even Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the head of the Convention which drafted the text, discourages the reader from dealing with Part III of the text, which is  the  longest  and most  detailed.24  The  Economist  rightly  ran  a  cover page  when  the  European  constitutional  project  was  disclosed suggesting to “bin it.”25 Could it have been otherwise? It is true that one distinguished former Minister of Justice in France did write in 2002 a model constitution which had the advantage of being short and more palatable, including actually most of the provisions which found their way to the text.26 It was possible to do better. But there is no point  in  trying  to  rewrite  history,  and  there  are  already  a  number  of reader‐friendly  editions  and  short  commentaries,  of  which  the introductions of Giscard and a Que Sais­Je  by Professor Christian Philip stand  their  ground  in  terms  of  clarity  and  comprehensiveness.27  One problem  is  the  type  of  “consolidator  Treaty” which  integrates  previous texts as so many layers, and the mechanisms in the Convention which, for sake  of  including  the  largest  number  of  proposals,  fails  to  devote  a stylistic  effort  which  could  have  brought  together  the  text  in  the  US‐concise manner of 1787. It is true also that the US constitution is a unique text  in  the  excellence  of  its  constitutional  style,  hardly  matched elsewhere on the planet. The  EU  Constitution  consists  of  four  parts,  and  a  number  of protocols  of  which  two  are  important.  Starting  with  the  end,  a  brief Fourth Part deals with amendments and transitional measures. A Third Part  consolidates  all  previous  treaties  and  is  therefore  the  longest  and most verbose. A Second Part  integrates  the bill  of  rights known as  “the European  Union  Charter  for  Fundamental  Rights,”  which  had  been approved in Nice four years earlier. The First Part is the most novel one, on which  I shall mostly dwell  to discern meaningful  trends  in 21st  Cen‐tury constitution making. Let me  suggest,  for  the  sake of  argument,  an  extreme  critical  line that  flows  from  the  universally  acknowledged  “democratic  deficit”  in Europe. Managing the 27–nation‐strong E.U. by 2009 does create in and 
 
 24. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, “Introduction à la lecture du projet de constitution pour 
l’Europe,” La Constitution pour l'Europe, Paris 2003, 75: “Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait lieu pour 
vous, lecteur, d’entreprendre la lecture en continu de cette troisième partie.” (Hereinafter, 
Giscard, ‘Introduction’.) 
 25. The Economist, 19 June 2003. 
 26. Robert Badinter, Une Constitution Européenne, Paris 2002. 
 27. Giscard, “Introduction,” Christian Philip, La Constitution Européenne, Paris 2004 
(Hereinafter Philip, La Constitution Européenne) The literature on the draft treaty known as 
the European Constitution is extensive. Most interesting are the minutes of the debates 
during the Convention, especially specialists’ reports, available on the EU convention site. 
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by itself problems which have been dealt with in the EU constitution as it could best: the creation of enhanced cooperation, which allows a group of EU countries to go forward with integration without being hampered by slow or reluctant member states. The Euro system is the most successful application of that principle, which does not include Britain and Sweden. Already  the  EU  operates on  a  system  of géométrie  variable,  and  this  is fine as long as it does not burst at the seams. Even bursting at the seams has already been envisaged, and happily dealt with, when Austria found itself in the throes of a government dominated by racist extremism. From that  emerged  a  “freezing  out”  procedure,  which  has  worked  well  to temper  extremism within Austria, without  the  EU  exploding  altogether under the shock. Of course, should one country turn so undemocratic as to  threaten  not  only  being  frozen  out  of  the  EU,  but  also  engaging  in military  hostilities  against  it,  the  issue would  become  grave  to  say  the least; but  even a major  country or  two  turning  in  this nasty way at  the same time would not unravel  the system, and that scenario might even be a privileged way to consolidate it. More immediate is the risk that new countries bring in their weak democratic system of deliberation, as is the case  of  Rumania  or  the  Republics  of  former  Yugoslavia.  But  the remarkable democratic strides of Turkey to bring its legal system, both in terms of its books and, more importantly, in the application of its laws, up to EU standards, are testimony to the immense leverage at the disposal of the  EU  for  smaller  countries.  Indeed  the  annual  reports  that  the Commission prepares on Turkish alignment with EU legal and economic standards  may  be  one  of  the  most  innovative  tools  for  the  spread  of democracy, human rights and the rule of law across the world since the collapse of the Soviet system.28 No,  the  problem  of  EU  democratic  deficit  does  not  lie  in  its expansion, and one can argue the exact opposite, namely that the world EU‐fashion, and more specifically the Middle East EU‐fashion, is a unique opportunity  allowed  by  the  emergence  of  a  unified  Europe.29  No,  the problem  of  the  EU  democratic  deficit  has  been  building  up  since  the Treaty of Rome, and that problem is constitutional, more specifically one of  separation  of  powers.  In  eighteen  months  of  deliberation,  the  E.U. Constitutional Convention simply failed to address it successfully. This  problem  is  eminently  Montesquieuian,  and  results  from  the vesting of  legislative and executive powers  in a strange EU mixture of a triangle  Council‐Commission‐Parliament,  in which  the  two  first  institu‐
 
 28. Commission reports on Turkey since 1999, available on the EU Commission’s site. 
 29. Original reflection in Robert Fossaert, chapter entitled “Le Monde façon Europe,” in 
his Le Monde au 21ème siècle: une Théorie des Systèmes Mondiaux, Paris 1991. 
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tions are dominant. Those who are elected “Europeanly,” that is the E.U. MPs, represent at best a fifth wheel in the carriage, as the French motto has it. You can take most of the EU Parliament away, the maximum lost is a  faint  forum  for  deliberation,  and  an  even  fainter  one  in  terms  of legislation.  While  the  legislative  process  has  been  time  and  again redrawn at the margins in order to enhance its powers, any person famil‐iar with  the  institutional working of  the EU knows  that Parliament  is  a place  for  occasional  protest,  possibly  elaborate  and  meandering “comitology,” not a power that anyone seriously takes into account. Now  the  Council,  being  composed  of  governments  who  are representative  of  their  people,  is  indispensable.  It  is  indispensable because  it  does  represent  the  people  within  the  Member  States,  and brings  into  the  federal  European  model  the  voice  of  the  constituent peoples.  The  Council  is  also  indispensable  because  even  if  it  does  not contribute a federal voice, one can hardly imagine how laws enacted by the Union could be binding within each country, in that ever wider field of  European  competence,  if  implementation  were  not  carried  by  the Council’s governments at home. How about the Commission? The Commission has real power. This 
is  the problem,  since the Commission has no popular  legitimacy, and  its members are appointed by the Council to play a European role. To make matters worse,  the  Constitution has managed  to  establish  a  number of new high positions,  including a would‐be president  for the Council who fights, over terms of preeminence, with the president of the Commission, much  as  the  High  Representative  for  the  Common  Foreign  Policy  and Security  has  already  fought  it  out  with  the  Commissioner  in  charge  of foreign affairs; this is a sorry sight indeed. The result, inevitably, is more muddle,  and  with  poor  legitimacy  at  that  for  the  new  bicephalous institutions. None of these positions will be filled by direct popular vote. No, the only serious step to bring democracy to Europe would have been  to  scrap  the  Commission  and  to  give  Parliament a  real  legislative role. One would still remain in the throes of the federal problem, but the democratic deficit would have been tackled head on, in a way that would have made it finally meaningful to vote for a European MP. It is now alas mostly  a  waste  of  time,  and  the  electors  are  far  savvier  than  the institutional  cooks  of  Europe  give  them  credit  for.  They  simply  do  not bother to vote for Parliament, nor do they show the slightest interest in what it does. To  underline  further  the  democratic  deficit  in  the  EU  version  of separation of powers, an “error” in the text is telling: no doubt attentive 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to the subdued role of Parliament,  the constituents entrusted EU MPs, as the text goes, with “electing” the president of the Commission.30 This  is further detailed under Article  I‐27, on the President of the European Commission:  1. Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament, and  after  having  held  the  appropriate  consultations,  the European Council, deciding by qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for the President of the Commission.  This  candidate  shall  be  elected  by  the  European Parliament by a majority of  its members.  If he or she does not obtain the required majority,  the European Council, acting by a qualified majority,  shall within one month propose a new can‐didate  who  shall  be  elected  by  the  European  Parliament, following the same procedure.31 
 A  strange  concept  for  an  election  indeed,  in  which  there  is  no contest. Behind  the awkward wording  stands a battle  for  legitimacy on the European level for the head of the executive, be s/he the president of the Council or the president of  the Commission. “Which president?”  is a good  question.  One  can  imagine  the  confusion  about  the  presidency, much in the way the confusion over who is Mr. Foreign Policy today, the Commissioner in charge, or the Council’s High Representative. Or indeed the president of the Commission. Maybe the ruse of the constituents was deliberate,  and  some  comments  suggest  that  an  ideal  situation,  which was  purposefully  left  open  by  the  Convention,  forced  the  bicephalous anomaly of two presidents, a president of the Council and a president of the  Commission,  so  that  they  end  up  being  one  and  the  same  by  the inevitable process of their redundancy.32 Nothing bars such a possibility in  the  text.  The  problem  remains.  Both  positions  result  from  a  choice exercised  by  the  Council,  not  by  an  election  between  competing candidates. So  back  to  basics  of  the  democratic  deficit:  the  Constituents were unable  to  see  boldly  enough  into  the  strange  system  of  separation  of powers they were perpetuating since the Treaty of Rome. They tinkered with it, by establishing a president of the Council who would conceivably stay in his or her position five years, instead of the current rotation of six 
 
 30. EU Constitution, “Article I-20: The European Parliament: 1. The European 
Parliament … shall elect the President of the Commission.” Emphasis added. 
 31. Emphasis added. 
 32. Philip, La Constitution Européenne, 92–93. 
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months  which  was  made  impossible  by  the  enlargement.  They  also tinkered with the presidency of  the Commission by  suggesting  that  the person  in  charge  would  be  elected  by  Parliament,  whereas  the candidate—only one—is nominated by the Council. This  leaves  little  democratic  legitimacy  in  the  choice  of  both executive  and  legislative  powers  in  Europe,  if  indeed  we  mean  by legitimacy the direct election of their EU leaders by the people of Europe. Both the presidents of the Council and of the Commission are nominated by the Council.  In the case of  the Council’s president,  the parliamentary representatives  of  European  voters  have  no  say.  In  the  case  of  the Commission’s  president,  parliamentary  function  is  at  best  perfunctory, despite  the  constitutional  language  intimating  his  “election”  by  Parlia‐ment. And to top it all, Parliament does not legislate. III. ACID TESTS AND EMERGING PATTERNS In  this  search  for  emerging patterns  in 21st  century  constitutionalism,  I would like to introduce another concept which has been of assistance in writing on family and gender issues: acid test.33 Acid is a metaphor which conjures up for different people and different cultures so many different images.  One  image,  at  least  in my western‐life  generation,  is  that  of  a powerful mind distorter which clouds one’s miserable life with a worldly vision  induced  by  hallucinogenic  drugs.  For  Iraqis  emerging  from  35 years  of  dictatorship,  acid  is  a  far  more  material  reality  as  the  most harrowing method  of  torture  used  by  the  former  regime—said  to  be  a specialty of the elder Hussein son—which consists in lowering the victim on a pulley into a basin of acid, first the toes, and drawing back the pulley up and down repeatedly. One shudders at the image, and we should leave it at that. What the small Oxford English Dictionary says about “acid tests” is  that they are “severe and conclusive.”  In an Iraqi context, one has no doubt they are conclusive. In all cases, acid tests are certainly severe, the more severe as they include faith‐based, and for all intents and purposes, “irrational”  convictions  imbued with  religions  that have competed with each other at least since God became word. Let  me  pursue  comparatively  three  such  acid  tests  which  I  have found  to  be  at  the  heart  of 21st  century  constitutionalism,  forming  is  a number  of  legal‐constitutional  fields which  bring  people  literally  up  in arms:  religion,  federalism,  two  areas  that  did  not  constitute  such  a contentious arena of constitutionalism in the 20th century, and to which is added the perennial issue of who is to be master: the presidency. 
 
 33. Mallat, “The Search For Equality in Middle Eastern Family Law,” al-Abhath 
(American University of Beirut), 48-49, 2000-2001, 7–63. 
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Religion.  Maybe  the  most  trying  of  all  acid  tests  is  the  place  of religion in the constitution. The “law and religion complex” operates as acid test not merely in an Eastern, Muslim context. It was, and continues to be, a central point of disagreement  in  European  constitution  making.  For  those  who  have followed  that  particular  aspect  of  the  debate,  suffice  to  see  the discrepancy between the German and French texts  in the translation of the  Preamble  to  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  in Nice  in  2000,  a discrepancy which  is,  in  constitution‐writing, unprecedented. While  the French text acknowledges the “spiritual” tradition in Europe, the German version renders it “religious.” The European constituents eventually succeeded in preventing that acid test from blocking the whole process. Thanks to the Irish ironically, they  finally  produced  a  version  which  leaned  towards  the  French disposition. Much  to  the  dislike  and  vocal  protests of  the  Vatican,  they declared the cultural heritage of the peoples of Europe in common, skip‐ping the mention of Christianity, religion and spirituality altogether. Now how does one deal with such a difficult test, the religion of the land  in  a  constitution? Of  tons  of  ink  spilled  on matters  constitutional, one would venture this is the issue of unique portent in the United States as well as in Europe and the Mideast, bringing religious affiliation in the domestic context from born‐again Bible belts to international “clashes of civilisations” defined religiously. The concern is not about to abate. To  make  some  progress  in  the  shape  of  religion  in  21st  century constitutionalism, a literary detour into the quasi‐universal law of indivi‐dual psychology, much in the vein of Sigmund Freud’s Oedipus Complex, may help: it is acknowledged that adolescence generally, if not a later age, raises a form of religious libido in each and every individual on earth. Of that experience two literary expressions are particularly telling. The first is by Bertolt Brecht, whose alluring though not likeable character, Mr. K., was once asked about whether there was a God:  Einer fragte Herrn K. ob es einen Gott gäbe. Herr K. sagte: “Ich rate dir, nachzudenken, ob dein Verhalten je nach der Antwort auf  diese  Frage  sich  ändern  wuerde.  Würde  es  sich  nicht ändern, dann können wir die Frage fallenlassen. Würde es sich ändern,  dann  kann  ich  dir  wenigstens  nich  soweit  behilflich sein,  dass  ich  dir  sage,  du  hast  dich  schon  entschieden:  Du brauchst einen Gott.34 
 
 34. “Die Frage, ob einen Gott gibt (on the question whether there is a God),” in Bertolt 
Brecht, Kalendergeschichte, Geschichte vom Herrn Keuner, Brecht Werke, V, Suhrkamp 
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 That adolescent part of  the argument  fits well with a rigid view of separation  between  church  and  state,  and  can  be  comforted  with  all kinds  of  citations,  including  from  the most  canonic  sources,  to  wit  the words of Christ to the effect of keeping to Caesar what is Caesar’s, or the lapidary  injunction  in  the Qur’an  about  “no  compulsion  in  religion.”  As one makes his peace with God or religion on this basis, acknowledging in the  process  that  there  is  more  to  it  than  Brechtian  need  or  Qur’anic rejection of state force to deal with one’s professed faith, another citation sticks in mind, that of the Levantine poet admonishing his children about the  penumbra  of  dignity  that  religion  brings  to  the  believers,  “wa  la 
tata’assabu  abadan  li­dinin,  fa  kullu  ta’assubin  yushqi  wa  yurdi/  likullin 
dinuhu wa likulli dinin masunu karamatin ta’ba al­ta’addi.”35 This  is  more  subtle  than  Brecht,  because  of  the  consideration  of one’s religion as shield, and not as sword,  to borrow a distinction from English  contract  law.36 The positive use of  religion  to shape  the state  is one  thing,  the  defence  of  religion  against  aggression  and  other  such humiliations  is another.  In our respective constitutions,  this  is generally the position adopted by the constituents: the state, or group of states in the  EU,  is  not  so  much  neutral  about  religion,  which  is  the  classical position of a rigid doctrine of separation between state and religion, as it acknowledges a heritage which  in the case of Europe  includes churches receiving  constitutional  recognition—and eventually tax relief  and  sub‐sidies;37 and in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, a role for Islam which is not militant. Islam is to be perceived as shield, and not as sword.38 The  formulation  in  both  the  Iraqi  and  Afghani  constitutions  is alluring.  In  the  first  case,  “No amendment  to  this Law may be made  to affect Islam.”39 Article 7 of the Iraqi TAL is equally protective:  
 
1997,  original written ca 1929–30, 218 (“One asked Mr. K. whether there was a God. Mr. K. 
answered: ‘I advise you to reflect first on whether your behaviour would change depending on 
the answer to that question. If it doesn’t change, then we can leave the question behind. If it 
does, then I can at least tell you that you have already decided: you need a God.’”) 
 35. Chibli Mallat (“Poet of the Cedars,” d.1961), Diwan (collected Poems), Beirut, 1952, 
vol. 2, 521: “Never follow a religion fanatically, all fanaticism brings misery and death/ to each 
his religion, and to each religion a penumbra of dignity that dislikes being attacked (and in a 
variation ta’ba al-tahaddi, that dislikes being challenged).” 
 36. Lord Denning, in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. 
[1947] K.B. 130. 
 37. Article I-52 of the EU constitutional project: “Status of churches and non-
confessional organizations. 1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.” 
 38. Expressed in Art. 17, Afghani Constitution as the duty of the state to “organise and 
improve mosques, madrasas and religious centres.” 
 39. Afghani Constitution, Art.3. 
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Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed  tenets  of  Islam,  the  principles  of  democracy,  or  the rights  cited  in Chapter Two of  this Law  [i.e.  the bill  of  rights] may  be  enacted  during  the  transitional  period.  This  Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and  guarantees  the  full  religious  rights  of  all  individuals  to freedom of religious belief and practice.  In  Afghanistan,  the  more  specific  formulation  of  compatibility between Islam and law is similar: “No law can be contrary to the sacred religion  of  Islam  and  the  values  of  this  Constitution.”  In  comparative Middle Eastern constitutionalism, where the acid test has generally taken the form of Islamic law being considered “the” in opposition to “a” source for  the  Constitution,  this  novel  formulation  upholds  a  conception  of religion as shield  in ways that shift  the terrain of  the debate onto areas which may relieve the test from some of its acid severity. This is not the end of the matter, however, as the law and religion complex  in modern  constitutionalism must  be  perceived  increasingly, in 21st century constitutionalism, on a far more elusive register: namely the  absence  of  religion—as  religious  affiliation—in  the  constitution. The problem  is no  longer whether  Islam  is  “state”  religion or not,  but how  collectivities  which  identify  themselves  on  the  basis  of  religious affiliation can stand  ignored by the constitutional set‐up.  I had several occasions  over  the  past  years  to  discuss  this  vexing  issue  in  modern constitutionalism,  so  I  will  not  pursue  it  further  here,  except  to  note that even the EU, secular as it may pretend to be, was unable to escape some form of recognition for established churches.40 
Federalism. Directly related to the issue of collective identification to  a  given  religious  denomination  is  the  problem  of  sectarianism,  or communitarianism  as  Indian  constitutionalists  call  it.  This  is  an  issue which conjures up an eminently federal mirror. Federalism  acts  as  an  additional  acid  test  in  21st  century constitutionalism, albeit in a muffled way: of the three constitutions, only the  Iraqi  TAL  mentions  the  word,  and  it  may  well  be  the  most courageous. In Afghanistan, one will also not find the word federal in the Constitution, but there is mention of peoples, tribes and “men” in various 
 
 40. Above n. 38. See also my “Du fait religieux dans les institutions,” in Mallat ed., 
L’Union Européenne et le Moyen-Orient: Etat des Lieux, Beirut 2004, 83-95. 
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articles.41 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing explains in his Preface how the word “communitarian” came to replace the word “federal” in Article I.1 of the Constitution,42 bringing an end to the heated debate between European federalists  and European  sovereignists  among  the  constituents. A more “federalist”  form  of  government  than  the  European  one  it  is  hard  to conceive, and the refusal  for the constituents to get drawn by the word indicates areas of “irrationality” getting into the public discourse in ways typical  of  acid  tests,  as  English  and  French  national  forms  of  the  Anti­
Federalist  get  pitted  against  mostly  German  and  more  recent  Spanish adhesion to the concept as a perfectly acceptable one constitutionally. Even a perfunctory approach of EU, Iraqi and Afghani constitution‐making  shows  that  all  these  issues are very much alive.  Indeed  the  “F” word is as much of a hot potato in Europe as it is in Afghanistan or Iraq, and  federalism could  indeed  represent a  line of  approach which brings together the inchoate world of 21st century constitutionalism: buckets of ink  have  also  been  spilled  over  European  federalism,43  and  those  of political  inspiration  are not  the most  interesting.  It might  have  proved expedient  for the constituents to have finally avoided the word  in their would‐be founding text, for they knew they were all practicing federalism like Molière’s character speaking in prose without knowing it. In Iraq, the battle for the inclusion of the word is far from over: I have often  opined  to  Iraqi  colleagues  that  constant  resort  to  sui  generis categories may not be useful (in this case the use of the concept of wilayat under Ottoman fashion to avoid using the Arabic fidirali). The advocacy has even found its way to Security Council Resolution 1546, which included the word in part upon my insistence with the Iraqi foreign minister. This has a story, and the jury is out on whether it is preferable to practice federalism à la  Molière,  or  whether  some  more  courage  would  not  be  amiss  for  the enrichment of the debate and its integrity.44 
Presidency. Lest we lose our bearings, constitutions are about who is  to be master. Put  in  less crude terms, 21st century constitutionalism 
 
 41. Afghani Constitution, Introduction paragraph 5, “aqvam wa mardum,” Art. 6, “aqvam 
va qaba’el.” 
 42. Giscard, Introduction, 34: “Aussi, dans le texte que j’ai préparé pour le Praesidium, 
ai-je substitué l’expression ‘sur le mode fédéral’ la formule ‘sur le mode communautaire.’” 
 43. Most heated was the celebrated debate in 2001–2002 between German foreign 
minister Joschka Fischer (EU as federation), president Jacques Chirac and his foreign 
minister Dominique de Villepin (EU as assembly or confederation of nations), and former 
president of the EU Commission Jacques Delors (EU as people’s federation sui generis). 
 44. On my intervention with Iraqi foreign minister Hoshyar Zibari for the inclusion of 
federalism in Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004), see the account in “2004, le 
Moyen-Orient en quête de non-violence: Un parcours personnel,” published in Mallat, 
Presidential papers, Beirut 2005. 
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does  not  escape  the  battle  about  leadership  and  its  democratic credentials since the dawn of history. Here appears the most muddled pattern  in  the  present  comparative  exercise:  in  Afghanistan,  the tailoring  of  the  constitutional  text  to  fit  a  particular  person  is  simply wrong,  and  the  sacrifice  of  real  checks  and  balances  to  presidential power, one can alas confidently predict, is a recipe for trouble to come. In  Iraq, matters  are  still  in  a  situation  of  flux,  owing  to  the  duality  of President‐Prime Minister  in  the  Transitional Administrative Law  (and in the 2005 “final” Constitution), but also to the real  test of  federalism as it is wont to develop—or get smothered by authoritarianism and/or chaos, both equally capable of marking the death of constitutionalism in the country for another generation. In the EU, the gross emptying of the concept  of  election  with  regard  to  the  choice  of  the  president  of  the Commission is indicative of a major problem yet to be solved. So  what  does  this  tell  us  about  that  long‐standing  acid  test,  the headship of executive power? The president as  leader voted  in directly by the people underlies the central problem of constitutional theory, which is couched, perhaps even papered over since Montesquieu, as a natural result of a doctrine of  separation  of  powers.  The  Montesquieuian  scheme  has  arguably always  been  in  crisis,  and  its  difficult  birth  remains  upon  us,  as troubling  in  the 21st century as  it was  in the second half of  the 18th.45 Separation  of powers,  in  that  description,  is  a way  to  say  that  society cannot vote  in  its parliament under universal  suffrage,  and vote  in  its president  also  in  universal  suffrage,  without  having  to  explain  why there  should  be  two  bodies  so  elected.  The  solution was  a  functional one, based on the idea that the first legislates, and the second executes. Power  becomes  therefore  segmented  functionally,  but  such segmentation  is  a  human  construct  which  divides  up  power  in  a disturbing and incoherent manner: for what does it mean issuing a law, as opposed to executing it? Federal arrangements are more convincing, because they point to a horizontal way in the division of powers which is based on a tangible division of  territory and  land. Horizontal devolution of power  is more coherent than the  functional division of powers between a parliament that enacts laws, a president/PM which applies them, and the judiciary which arbitrates conflicts arising from that application. Federalism as a 
 
 45. This is developed in Mallat, “Droit comparé au 18ème siècle: Influences françaises 
sur la common law,” Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger, 3/1994, 383-400 
(arguing that Montesquieu and Lord Mansfield understood separation of powers in a manner 
profoundly different from the way it became operational). 
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successful  constitutional  arrangement,  a  comparative  reading  of  the three  constitutions  suggests,  has  far  more  credentials  than  the domestic  functional  division  of  powers  extant  in  21st  century constitutionalism. While the Montesquieuian scheme lags behind, there is  no  decidedly  convincing  route  out  of  the  conundrum,  which  is illustrated  in  the  three  questions  by  the  absence  of  a  convincing mechanism that resolves it. EPILOGUE The  federal order;  Religion’s proactive  challenge  to  constitutionalism; the confusion in the tripartite separation of powers underlying the role of  the  presidency  and  its  legitimacy;  these  are  three  problem  areas which  define  the  shape  of  things  constitutional  in  the  21st  century. Beyond the natural disparity in the respective traditions and conditions of emergence of the three constitutions, it may be helpful to end on the special  form  of  internationalism  which  seems  to  mark  21st  century constitutionalism. One  needs  to  reflect,  in  a  planet  that  no  longer  recognizes  the domain of  internal  affairs  as  a  self‐contained one, on  the mechanisms which may ensure that domestic problems do not spill  over regionally and internationally. Even more positively, the question of constitutions as  model  can  no  longer  be  avoided:  the  world  after  Europe,  in  the fashion  adumbrated  by  the  so‐called  proximity  policy  of  Art.I‐57  is  a case  in  point,  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  success  in  Afghanistan and/or  in  Iraq  will  make  constitutional  standards  affect  an  immense area, reaching into India through Pakistan and Kashmir, and across the Middle East and North, including Palestine‐Israel. There  is  no  harm  putting  the  matter  into  the  first  leg  of  the Kantian bifurcation that the chapter opened onto, with the contrasting vantage  points  drawn  from  Kant’s  Treatise  on  Perpetual  Peace:  its failure  on  the  ground  since  1795,  and  its  continuous  success  in  the battle of ideas  in ways that compel us to rediscover the Treatise again and  again  at  key  junctures  in  human  history—the  French‐Atlantic Revolution, which saw  its birth,  the  failed attempts  in the Congress of Vienna  to  go  beyond  the  Westphalian  paradigm  of  sovereign  nation‐states,  through  the  collapse of  the Wilson vision  in Versailles,  and  the shortcomings of the UN in the wake of World War II. The  constitutions  just  examined  constitute,  through  their  birth and potential projections beyond  their borders,  an attempt  to  include Kant’s cosmopolitan law into their  frame. This is halting and timid, but the pattern  is  there  for the discerning, whether  in terms of  federalism for  Iraq,  a  unique  novelty  in  the Middle  East  (and  Europe),  crimes  of 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war  as  a  constitutional  category  in  Afghanistan,  or  transnational projections of the EU, both federal and international. I would  like  to  conclude  on  yet  another  horizon, which  conjures up, in converging ways two millennia apart, Aristotle and Paul Kahn. At its simplest, the issue is one of “man”—less so woman, and this in itself is telling—”as a political animal”:  “The entire effort of the international human rights movement  is rooted  in this vision of well‐being. No one, on this view, should die or suffer for politics.” One could read this in the most  exciting  acknowledgement  of  the  Preamble  to  the  interim  Iraqi constitution: the people of Iraq, it says, “reject violence and coercion in all  their  forms,  and  particularly when  used  as  instruments  of  govern‐ance.” One can also hear it plainly in a more relative, but potentially more “applicable”  utterance  interspersed,  in  a manner which  seems  novel  in constitution‐writing,  in  the  repeated  references  throughout  the Afghani text  to  the  scourge  of  “crimes  against  humanity.”  In  both  Iraq  and Afghanistan, societies which have been bled white through three decades of  continuing  horror,  are  showing  the  way  to  others,  even  to  Europe, where  the  constituents  remain  behind  in  terms  of  the  crucial  task  of preventing crimes against humanity from remaining unpunished.46 This  points  to  the  meta‐conclusion  of  our  emerging  patterns, which is the next horizon of constitutionalism. How can human beings structure  their  domestic  and  international  world  to  make  politics redundant?  Depoliticisation,  I  would  like  to  conclude,  is  the  ultimate horizon of comparative constitutionalism, that moment in history when it  matters  little  what  politics  and  politicians  say,  because  they  have become by‐and‐large irrelevant to the happiness of the citizen. But this is better left to constitution‐making in the 22nd century. 
 
 46. Mallat, “Des relations privilégiées,” supra n. 8, section discussing transnational 
justice. 
